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ABSTRACT
SI I ARON ABIMBOI.A SALU: Fraud as an incentive for change in Corporate America
(Under the direction of Dr. Mark Wilder)

In this work, 1 explore the relationship between fraud and related changes in Corporate
America with the express intention of showing that in spite ofthe negativity associated
with fraud, it can still act as a mechanism that sets the wheels of change in motion in
Corporate America. Of all the different kinds of fraud, this research focused on
fraudulent financial reporting in corporations. In order to accomplish this goal, several
research questions were examined which were aimed at examining the methods by which
fraud is perpetrated, the relationship between fraud and business ethics and the effects
fraud has had on various aspects of the society, including government regulation and
public confidence in the accounting profession. With regards to government regulation,
there was particular focus on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as one of the major legislations
dealing with fraud in corporations. The research findings showed that having a weak
corporate ethical culture as well as a weak personal code of ethics were factors that
increased the likelihood of perpetrating fraud. The proliferation of cases ofaccounting
fraud has encouraged the growth and development ofa new area of accounting called
forensic accounting. In addition, this increase has also encouraged government
involvement in coiporations, which has changed the face ofcorporate governance. The
research concludes by asserting that fraud could act as an incentive for change in the
American corporate world.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

PARTI:

INTRODUCTION

PART II:

ACCOUNTING FRAUD BASED ON RECENT SCANDALS

11

PART III: EXAMINING ACCOUNTING FRAUD FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF BUSINESS ETHICS

31

PART IV: EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTING FRAUD

38

CONCLUSION:

47

APPENDIX:

50

NOTES

64

BIBLIOGRAPHY

84

IV

1: Introduction
Definition of Fraud
The word ‘fraud' carries a negative connotation, and to argue otherwise would
entail overriding public opinion. At the same time, there are many different definitions of
fraud depending on the context of the fraud. To put it in the words of Jack C. Robertson
and fimothy J. Louwers,“several kinds of fraud are defined in the laws, while others are
matters of general understanding."' For the purpose of this research. I will examine
various definitions of fraud from an accounting, or specifically, an auditing perspective.
The first definition of fraud is based on one of tlie Statements on Auditing
Standards(SAS). Statements on Auditing Standards are issued “in a numbered series by
the Auditing Standards Board(ASB)and they are formally treated as ‘'interpretations

of

the ten Generally Accepted Auditing Standards required for public accountants.^ If an
external auditor does not follow the stipulations specified in the auditing standards, it can
be assumed that he or she performed an incomplete audit.''
According to Statement on Auditing Standards(SAS)99,fraud can be defined as
“an intentional act that results in a material misstatement in financial statements that are
the subject of an audit.”^ This definition is quite similar to another definition that states
that "fraud consists of knowingly making material misrepresentations offact, with the
intent of inducing someone to believe the falsehood and act upon it and thus, suffer a loss
or damage.”^’ This definition encompasses all the varieties by which people can lie, cheat,
steal and dupe other people.^ Both ofthe two foregoing definitions highlight two inherent

1

or
aspects of fraud: it is intentional and it involves making material misstatements
misrepresentations.^ These two aspects of fraud differentiate it from errors, which are
unintentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial
sUitemenls.

fhe third definition of fraud sums up the preceding points by describing
10

fraud **in the context of auditing financial statements

as an intentional misstatement

-11

of financial statements.

When people discuss or think about fraud, several terms are used and they include
the following:
Employee Fraud - the use offraudulent means to take money or other
property from an employer. It usually involves falsifications ofsome kindfalse documents, lying, exceeding authority, or violating an employer s
policies. It consists of three phases:(1)the fraudulent act,(2)the conversion
of the money or property to the fraudster’s use, and(3)the cover-up.
Embezzlement - a type of fraud involving employees’ or nonemployees’
wrongfully taking money or property entrusted to their care, custody, and
control, often accompanied by false accounting entries and other forms of
lying and cover-up.
Larceny - simple theft—^for example, an employee taking an employer’s
money or property that has not been entrusted to the custody ofthe employee.
Defalcation - another name for employee fraud, embezzlement, and larceny.
SAS 82 also calls it “misappropriation of assets.”
Management fraud - deliberate fraud committed by management that injures
investors and creditors tlirough materially misleading financial statements.

2

I he class of perpetrators is management; the class of victims includes
inv estors and creditors; and the instrument of perpetration is financial
statements. Sometimes management fraud is referred to as “fraudulent
financial reporting.'"
Fraudulent financial reporting - defined by the National Commission on
Fraudulent Reporting(1987)as intentional or reckless conduct, whether by
act or omission, that results in materially misleadingfinancial statements.
Direct-effect illegal acts - violations oflaws or government regulations by
the company or its management or employees that produce direct and material
effects on dollar amounts in financial statements.*^
For this study, the focus will be on two types offraud, fraudulent financial reporting
and misappropriation of assets,'^ with more emphasis on the former. I have already
defined fraudulent financial reporting, but there is a need to spell out what constitutes
misappropriation of assets and also to discuss fraudulent financial reporting in more
detail.
According to Arens, Elder and Beasley, misappropriation of assets “is fraud that
involves thefi; of an entity’s assets.”*"* Most ofthe time, amounts that are immaterial to the
financial statements are involved but management is particularly concerned with the loss
of company assets.' In addition, when people refer to misappropriation of assets, they
usually refer to employee theft as well as theft involving people within the organization.*^'
However, in many cases, this type offraud involves people outside the organization such
as suppliers.'^

3

I-raudulcnt financial reporting, on the other hand, is ‘‘an intentional misstatement or
omission of amounts or disclosures with the intent to deceive users'
19

amounts(not disclosures) are deliberately misstated,

18

and in most cases.

Assets and income are overstated

in a majoritv of these cases. In other cases, liabilities and expenses are omitted so that
income appears to be better than it really is."^ However,some companies also
intentionalIv understate income for various reasons.

21

Some companies that are privately-

held understate income in order to pay lower income taxes.^" Some other companies may
understate income “when earnings are high to create a reserve of earnings or *‘cookie jar
reserves" that may be used to increase earnings in future periods. This practice is called
v23

income smoothing or earnings management.

A formal definition of earnings

management states that it “involves deliberate actions taken by management to meet
,24

earnings objectives'

while income smoothing can be defined as “a form of earnings

management in which revenues and expenses are shifted between periods to reduce
„25

fluctuations in earnings.
Before fraud can be perpetrated, there are some conditions that are necessary to
facilitate it or encourage its perpetration. The three conditions for fraud that facilitate
fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets are referred to as the fraud
triangle"^ and they include:
●

Incentives / Pressures. Management or other employees have

incentives or pressures to commit fraud.
●

Opportunities. Circumstances provide opportunities for management

or employees to commit fraud

4

●

Attitudes / Rationalization. An attitude, character, or set of ethical

values exists that allows management or employees to commit a dishonest
act. or they are in an environment that imposes sufficient pressure that
27

causes them to rationalize committing a dishonest act.
According to David P. Hoffman, an Ernst and Young partner working under the
28

investigative and dispute services practice in Atlanta,

there are some factors that can

clearly indicate fraud and they include:
●

excessive pressure on management to meet analysts' expectations that
leads to pressure to bend the rules with respect to financial statements,

●

pressure on management to keep growth and profitability going in a
competitive market that is saturated with a shrinking customer base for
which it is competing;

●

ineffective monitoring of management due to a weak board or audit
committee;
formal or informal restrictions placed on an auditor that inappropriately
limit his or her access to people in a company, specifically the audit
committee or the board;
management that is controlled by a single, domineering person;
significant related-party transactions that are not made in the ordinary
course of business;
unusual legal entities or inappropriate managerial lines of authority in a
complex organizational structure;
inappropriate or marginal accounting;

5

●

frequent disputes with auditors;

●

changing auditors; and

●

management that has no financial expertise.

29

A General Overview of Fraud
Given that fraud has been formally defined and fraudulent financial reporting
specified, it is important to note that a discussion of this nature is incomplete without
mentioning the role of fraudsters in this whole process.^^ We usually think offraudsters
as people who have limited education and are from poor family backgrounds.

Today,

however,‘Hhe average fraudster is increasingly more sophisticated; he or she is well,,32

educated, well-spoken, well-traveled and well-connected.

In fact, according to

Robertson and Louwers, fraudsters do not differ in appearance from most people and this
. 33

is apparent from the following characteristics that they have outlined:
Likely to be married
Probably not tattooed
Educated beyond high school
Range in age from teens to over 60
Employment tenure from 1 to 20 or more years
Not likely to be divorced
Member of a church
No arrest record
Socially conforming
34

Usually act alone(70 percent of incidents).

6

As an example. Jeff Skilling, the former Chief Executive Officer of Enron
Corporation,“received his B.S. in applied science at Southern Methodist University, and
his M.B.A. at Harvard Business School. He was a consultant at McKinsey & Company
before moving to Enron (around 1987), helping the company create a forward market in
natural gas."^'^ Clearly, he was well educated. As another example, Bemie Ebbers, the
former CI^O of WorldCom was described as ‘‘a hard guy not to like.”^^ In fact, he was a
ver\' active member of his church, regularly teaching Sunday School and he also began
each business meeting with prayer.^^ In addition, he was well-educated beyond high
school, having obtained a bachelor’s degree in physical education as well as an honorary
doctorate from Tougaloo College.

Samuel Waksal,the former Chief Executive of

ImClone Systems had both a bachelor’s degree and a doctorate degree in immunology
from Ohio State University

As a final example, Kenneth Lay who was the Chairman of

Enron Corporation is currently sixty-four years old, still married to his wife, Linda
Phillips Lay, and like the other people mentioned in the preceding examples, he was also
well-educated, having a bachelors, masters and doctorate degrees in economics from the
Universities of Missouri and Houston.^^ From all these examples, it is clear that today,
fraudsters are well-educated and well-connected.
Another aspect offraud in the corporate world pertains to the means by which it is
detected. Some ways in which fraud is detected have changed, but in many respects, this
change is just a modification of old detection methods."*’ An example of this is whistle
blowing."*^ Whistle blowing hotlines are now available, but there is increasing concern
over the security of the whistle blower’s job, in the case of uncovering fraudulent
dealings in a corporation."*^ However, laws for the protection of whistle blowers are

7
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insufficient.

thereby discouraging the compilation of important data from such a
45

lucrative source.

Recently, the Justice system has played a more prominent role in the evolution of
fraud and fraud detection techniques. In the past, the Justice system avoided issues
46

related to fraud in the corporate world.

That changed, however, with the emergence of

the Corporate Fraud fask Force in July 2002, which was established ‘‘to coordinate the
government’s response to the parade of accounting scandals started by Enron
..47

Corporation.

So far. the task force has met with success, and has “transformed how

corporate fraud cases are prosecuted, marshaling the government's resources into a
»48

multiagency, multioffice approach.’

However,the task force, like the fraudsters

themselves, is changing its approach to fraud. It is now focused on using a preventionbased approach instead ofjust directing all its attention on the detection and correction of

fraud.49
Fraud is not limited to one aspect of a corporation’s life. Both the employers and
the employees play a role in the perpetration and extension offraud. This role may be
active or even passive. Thus, the problem offraud also stems from the efficiency of
corporate governance.^® In addition, it was recently reported that “commercial banks may
be fuelling corporate fraud, by denying investigators access to accounts of clients that
„51

might be linked to fraud.

This is, of course, an ethical issue but it also raises the

question of how to apply the cost-benefit rule. In this case, is it more important to protect
the privacy and identity of clients who may be involved in fraud or is serving justice on
potentially guilty parties a greater benefit in the long run? This illustrates how an ethical
concern could be a limitation to the correction offraud.

8

Inasmuch as the solution to fraud is clearly a matter of prevention/'^' this is more
or less just a theoretical view, because the idea of preventing fraud is not familiar to
corporations. In fact, “convincing businesses to think ahead oftime about what might go
wrong is difficult

53

in spite of the present corporate climate.’** However,this has

encouraged the development of specialized skills which has led to the establishment of
professional bodies, aimed at curbing this problem, such as the Association of Certified
Fraud F.xaminers.''''
Purpose of the Research and Research Question
The purpose of this research is to provide evidence that there are some positive
sides to the crime of fraud. In fact, fraud can actually set the wheels ofchange in motion
so that the corporate world and ultimately, the society are changed for the better in
tangible and positive ways. These “positives” do not in any way encourage the idea of
fraud, but this research provides evidence that fraud does have some uses that actually
improve the corporate structure in the long run.
Related to the purpose ofthe research, several questions have been identified
which should provide greater insight into the concept offraud. These questions will also
provide a framework for the research and are as follows:
a. If fraud is a negative thing, can it have ANY positive effects? If so, what are its
positive effects and how have they changed the face of accounting in the corporate
world?
b. What efforts are corporations making to prevent and detect fraud? How effective are
these measures and are they sustainable in the long run or are they short-term goals
that will be revised frequently due to social changes?
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c. Whal docs the current trend in accounting fraud say about the role of business ethics
in the corporate world? Is there a correlation or relationship between business ethics
and fraud or is fraud influenced primarily by other factors? Will a greater regard for
business ethics result in a decline in cases of fraudulent financial reporting?
Importance of Research / Contribution of Thesis
fhe importance of this research stems from the inescapable reality that as long as
financial reporting is required in the corporate world, fraud will always be an imminent
threat to the proper presentation of financial information. Fraud and social change
represent a vicious cycle because as new measures of preventing and detecting fraud are
developed to ensure the correct and proper presentation offinancial information to users,
those who perpetrate fraud will also continue to seek and develop new ways of getting
around the system. Hopefully, the current research will highlight the changes that are
effective and sustainable as well as the areas ofchange that have remained ineffective for
various reasons.
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II: Accounting Fraud Based on Recent Scandals
Types of Accounting Frauds / Scandals with specific examples:
Fhe following section deals with specific instances offraudulent financial
reporting that have taken place over the last decade in the corporate world. These
examples are limited to American corporations. A later section will examine the
international cases as they relate to accounting fraud on the international level.
Accounting scandals have been the subject of various news stories because of
the importance of accurate and reliable financial reports. These reports must be kept in
accordance with Generally Acceptable Accounting Principles(GAAP)and failure to
abide by these rules is what usually leads to these scandals. These scandals are a
reflection of fraud on the part of the offending company because companies strive to
present a financial picture to their shareholders and stockholders that is better than what
actually exists. Because companies face this paradox between giving accurate financial
reports and pleasing shareholders,“mistakes” or deliberate attempts by companies to
misrepresent financial information have been very costly. Scandals have been separated
into two categories - financial reporting scandals and other scandals.
Financial Reporting Scandals
i.

Capitalizing Expenses:
One type of financial information misrepresentation involves reporting current

expenses in future periods and this practice is usually referred to as capitalizing expenses.
In other words, one aspect ofimproper accounting involves “not booking expenses

11

,o6

immediately but pushing them into the future,

Specifically, capitalizing expenses gives

companies the opportunity “to defer certain business costs by amortizing them over a
number of years, which makes current operating income appear greater than it actually
.57

is.’

While this is a relatively simple procedure, it is fraudulent because it
58

simultaneously understates expenses and boosts net income and assets.
Capitalizing expenses has been practiced in many different industries such as the
telecom and cable industries for a very long time.^^ The problem is that different industry
observers have their own opinions on how the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), which govern this practice, should be interpreted.^® As a result ofthis
disagreement, each case of capitalizing expenses is subject to different kinds of
61

interpretation.

This disagreement calls for government intervention in the form of

continuous analysis of this practice.^^ The end result of government’s intervention is that
companies are now more likely to adopt a more conservative approach to the
63

capitalization of expenses.
However, a conservative approach for financial reporting purposes may not
necessarily work well for tax purposes,®"^ as was illustrated in a 1992 Supreme Court case
dealing with the merger oftwo companies- Unilever United States Incorporated and the
National Starch and Chemical Corporation.^^ In that case, the court made it mandatory
for the companies to capitalize certain mergers and acquisitions(M & A)costs.^^ The
reasoning behind this decision was that if the companies had not capitalized those
expenses, they could have reported lower earnings and made certain tax deductions they
were not permitted to make.^^ Another case of capitalizing expenses, which was an
68

extreme case, involved WorldCom.
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In June 2002, WorldCom Inc., a telecommunications company found itself in the
middle of a serious accounting scandal.^^ One of its internal auditors, Cynthia Cooper,
had been asked to conduct a financial review by the chief executive and this involved
,,70

“spot-checking records of capital expenditures,

She discovered that in consecutive

quarters in 2001, Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan had been using fraudulent means
to account for one of the company's major expenses-“charges paid to local telephone
networks to complete calls.’'^* These were operating expenses worth $3.8billion, but he
treated them as capital expenditures, and according to the Wall Street Journal,“the
maneuver was worth hundreds of millions of dollars to WorldCom's bottom line.
,72

effectively turning a loss for all of2001 and the first quarter of2002 into a profit.
After making this discovery, Cynthia Cooper promptly reported her findings to
Max Bobbitt who headed the audit committee. Consequently, the CFO was fired, the U.S.
Justice Department conducted a probe on the key people involved and the SEC “filed
,,73

civil fraud charges against WorldCom,

The company filed for bankruptcy and later re-

emerged as MCI Incorporated.’^ Presently, the eleven WorldCom directors are required
to pay $20.25 million from their personal funds in order to settle the lawsuit that former
investors brought against the company.’^ However,to date the investors have only been
76

able to recover a portion of their losses.
In spite of the preceding cases Just mentioned, it may be the case that companies
will not stop capitalizing costs in the near future. In fact, there is the possibility that
“companies will become more aware of investors' increased skepticism about corporate
balance sheets, which could make management continue to capitalize expenses, but be
„77

more likely to spell out the justification for such accounting treatment in the footnotes.

13

ii. Off Balance Sheet Financing:
Off balance-sheet-financing is used to refer to ‘Ihe non-reporting by a company
on its balance sheet of debt related to costs incurred (but likewise reported), or
ownership, or control, or at least the use of, cash or other assets.”^^ All the various
methods of practicing this type of financing have one common characteristic: They give a
company the ability to omit certain obligations from the balance sheet, and in many
79

cases, without running the risk of violating the GAAP that is currently in place.
However, the various methods of off-balance-sheet financing depend heavily on
carefully organizing the following:*^
●

Separate entity relationships, or

●

The executory nature of certain transactions where it can be argued
that the actual receipt of goods or services has not yet occurred, or

●

81

Innovative financial instruments or arrangements.

The extensive use of off-balance-sheet financing by companies suggests that they
perceive numerous benefits from this practice, including:
●

Improvement in the company’s debt-to-equity ratio. For many
companies this is important not only for borrowing purposes but also
for reducing the perceived “riskiness” oftheir stock, thus affecting the
market value oftheir stock favorably.

●

Borrowing capacity. Sometimes, preventing liabilities from appearing
on the balance sheet will enable a company to borrow more than it
otherwise could, especially if there are contractual debt limit

14

restrictions related to what actually appears on the company s balance
sheet.
●

Borrowing costs. A more attractive-looking financial position may
result in lower borrowing costs. Lower borrowing costs also may
result from certain off-balance-sheet financing methods such as project
financing arrangements and interest rate swaps.

●

Management compensation. To the extent that management
compensation plans are tied to ratios or reported earnings that are
affected favorably by off-balance-sheet financing, management
benefits directly from the use ofthese arrangements.

●

Risk-sharing and tax management. The use of limited partnership
arrangements provide means for a company to spread the risk
associated, for example, with research and development activities and
82

to defer tax payments.
From the foregoing advantages, it is not very difficult to see why companies
would adopt this practice. However, in practicing off-balance sheet financing, companies
are supposed to make sure that they provide sufficient disclosures ofthese activities

SO

that their financial statements do not deceive users®^ in any way. Unfortunately, this is
where some companies have gone wrong and Enron serves as an example of a company
that adopted this practice^^ for fraudulent purposes.
The Enron scandal, like the WorldCom scandal, took place in 2002, and it
embodies off-balance-sheet financing as well as several other deceitful accounting
practices. First of all, Enron established a new Special Purpose Entity(SPE)called

15

Chewco and the administration of this company consisted of Enron executives and some
85

investors from outside the company. In doing this, Enron followed a practice of offbalance-sheet financing, common among US companies, whereby '‘companies establish
SPHs by having outside investors contribute 3% of capital ofthese SPEs so that they can
be considered independent and off the balance sheets for those corporations who
^i86

By adopting this strategy, Enron managed to

contribute 97% of the invested capital.

exclude several expenses and liabilities from its financial statements(balance sheet and
income statement) and instead, it “included false gains on its speculative investments
,,87

various technology-oriented companies,

m

The effect ofthese actions was that it

projected an illusion of a favorable and desirable financial position, which misled
88

investors.

In addition, Enron used derivatives and SPEs to cover up some speculator losses it
experienced on technology stock.*^ By using a "price swap derivative," it made an
agreement with Raptor, one of its SPEs,to the effect that ifthe value of Raptor s assets
declined, it would swap its stock for a loan from Raptor.^^ Eventually, whenever Raptor’s
assets declined, Enron was also able to justify a decline in its own assets by conversely
issuing stock.^' Consequently, Enron concealed major losses and debts that arose from
investing in unprofitable businesses while simultaneously “inflating the value of other
„92

troubled businesses, including its new ventures fiber-optic bandwidth.
Arthur Andersen, Enron’s accountants, was fully aware of what was going on and
backed up their client. However,“Enron collapsed because ofthe derivatives deals it
entered into with its more than 3,000 off-balance sheet subsidiaries and partnerships-such
„93

as JEDI, Raptor and LJM.

As a result ofthe scandal, Enron filed for bankruptcy and

16

1

94

Arthur Andersen informed the SEC of its decision to stop auditing public companies.
Also, the scandal has affected Enron’s competitors such as Dynegy by eliminating credit
95

support for energy trading.
iii. Accelerated Booking of Future Revenues:
Another improper accounting practice that constitutes fraud is frontloading
income.

that is. booking uncertain future revenues.”^’ Halliburton Inc., an oil services

company, was accused of frontloading income while it was under the leadership of Vice
President Dick Cheney

Apparently, in 1998 and 1999,“when a big construction

project, like a natural gas processing plant, went over budget, the company booked the
over-budget charges as revenue under the assumption that the customer would pay later.
„99

ignoring possible disputes,

Under this method, it increased its pretax income and
100

misled investors for a period of eighteen months,

When the SEC looked into this issue.

it criticized Halliburton’s failure to report this new method but decided that the new
method was acceptable.
Later, Halliburton was accused of“serial accounting fraud”‘^‘ from 1998 to 2001
102

and underreporting its asbestos liability, another form ofoff balance sheet financing.
As a result, “Halliburton has been forced to place a unit into bankruptcy and create a $4.6
103

billion fund to compensate asbestos victims.

In addition. The SEC filed enforcement
104

actions against Halliburton’s CFO and controller.
Another revenue-related accounting scandal involved Xerox Corp., the copier
company. Like Enron’s case, with Xerox one scandal led to another so that eventually
105

there was a culmination of various scandals the company had to deal with.

First,

“Xerox used complex maneuvers to accelerate the booking ofrevenue from office

17

106

equipment that it leased in long-term deals,'

This practice continued well into the late

1990s because it was facing several problems, including increased competition from
U)7

computer printers.
In 2002, the SEC forced Xerox to make a restatement of its revenue for that time
period (1997-2000) which caused a reallocation of$2 billion of its revenue for that
lOS

period.

In June 2001, the company also had to restate revenues because between 1998

and 2000. it had overstated profits by manipulating $100 million reserved for merger
i()i>

costs.

By overstating profits in this way, it succeeded in making its financial
no This
statements look better in the periods of overstatement than in later periods,
restatement was triggered by an internal probe that KPMG,Xerox s accountants at the
time, had forced Xerox to conduct, and this eventually led to the dismissal of KPMG as
lit

the firm’s auditor.

Initially, Xerox had heightened suspicions by emphasizing that an external audit
or review must be limited to its Mexican office. Xerox never acknowledged the
questionable accounting practices mentioned above. Instead, its CFO, Mr. Romeril,
condemned the financial statement issue in a Xerox news release but carefully stated in a
112

worldwide news release, that no other Xerox office faced these problems.
iv. Meeting Analysts’ estimates
Sometimes, accounting scandals arise from the pressure to meet financial
analysts’ estimates. The case of HealthSouth Corp. is a good example of this case. Its
CEO Richard Scrushy was “charged with conspiracy, mail, wire and securities fraud,
,,113

false statements, false certifications and money laundering,

Scrushy did not disclose

the true financial state ofthe company to shareholders or the general public.*

18

Instead, he

chose lo lie and dress the financial statements to the extent that he personally endorsed
115

and affirmed their accuracy to the SEC.

His actions were based on the fact that he and

other top officials of HealthSouth received their bonuses, compensation and other
benefits based on the financial performance of the company,

116

By misrepresenting the
117

information in the books, he presented a false picture of the company’s financial state.
118

In other words, the company looked better than it actually was, financially.
In carrying out this fraud,'‘during 1996 and 2003, internal reports by
HealthSouth’s corporate accounting staff showed that the company routinely failed to
produce sufficient net income to meet the expectations of Wall Street securities analysts,
the market and its own internal budgets - a failure that Scrushy and others referred to as
not making the numbers.

119

Therefore, they made fictitious entries on the books to

support their actions. Subsequently, over the period oftime that this fraud was
120

committed, the company’s income was overstated by $2.7 billion.

The fraud

allegedly included false entries in income statement and balance sheet accounts,
including property, plant and equipment accounts, cash accounts and accounts receivable,
among others...and they referred to those methods as "filling the hole" or "filling the
m121

gap.

Apparently, Scrushy was so obsessed with covering his tracks, that he monitored
122

his employees and accessories via e-mail and other means,

In addition, he also

encouraged the propagation of the fraudulent activity by providing them with incentives
123

to commit fraud such as giving them large compensation packages.
Another case in focus, the Rite Aid case, serves as a very good example of
overstating net income in order to meet market expectations.

In the late 1990s, Rite
125

Aid was one of the first companies to be involved in a major accounting scandal.
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It

126

nearly tiled for bankruptcy because it overstated its net income by $1.6 billion.

Its

stock price plunge from a high of$60 in 1999 to a low ofjust $1.85 a share in late 2000.
Homier Rite Aid Chief Executive Martin Grass, former Chief Financial Officer Frank
Bergonzi and former Vice Chairman Franklin Brown faced charges of mail fraud, ware
«127

fraud and lying to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Mr. Brown was accused

of“ripping-off' the company at a time when the company was crippled by its dire
financial state.

Bergonzi served as Grass'"pencil" in recording entries such as

pharmaceutical rebates that helped fill a $100 million earnings shortfall in Rite Aid's
129

Grass was held responsible for a loss of$53.1 million

fiscal 1999 fourth quarter,

from additional credits that were charged to vendors for damaged and outdated goods.
130

called "upcharges" by the government.
In mid-2000. Xerox was involved in another scandal (this time related to meeting
analysts estimates) where it was discovered that there was a question as to whether top
Xerox management prepared financial statements "to achieve certain earnings rather
than trying to ‘‘get it right,

This information was uncovered as a result of several

probes conducted by Xerox’s auditors’ law firm of Akin, Gump,Strauss, Hauer and
Feld.132
(v) Round-tripping and Network capacity swapping:
Another malpractice that has led to several scandals is round-tripping and network
133

capacity swapping.

A round trip transaction is said to have occurred when “one

company sells or exchanges goods or services or monetary assets with another company
and, in return, buys similar goods, services, or monetary assets from the other company
„134

for equal-or almost equal-value.

Consequently, each company has little or no gain on
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135

the sale.

Not all round trip transactions are used for illegitimate purposes,
137

example, broadcasters usually exchange air-time for goods or services,

To cite an

In such

transactions, “the broadcaster will credit revenue for the fair value of on-air advertising
while debiting accounts in equal amounts for the nonmonetary goods or services it
received.

*●138

Even though some of these transactions appear to be economically sound,

the problem with this practice is that some companies actually manipulate it as a means
139

of increasing the income and volume that is reported in their financial statements.
Thus, in an effort to meet or surpass earnings, energy trading companies have
discovered “how to inflate revenue by fake trades knovm as "round-tripping," whereby
one company sells energy to another company, which sells it back to the first company at
the same price, allowing both companies to report a sale even though nothing was
actually purchased.

,,140

Similar to round-tripping, network capacity swapping is usually

practiced by telecommunication companies whereby “telecom companies trade equal
141

amounts of telecom capacity, and record a revenue increase -to bolster financials.
Several companies have been found guilty of both practices, including, Qwest, Global
142

Crossing, Dynegy, CMS Energy and Reliant Resources.
Other Scandals
i.

Insider trading:
A common malpractice that has resulted in several scandals is insider trading,

which involves trading or making investment decisions based on information that is not
143

generally and widely available to the public,

Even though the preceding statement

gives a general idea of what insider trading is, it is necessary to answer the following
questions in order to get a better understanding of this practice: First of all, “who are the
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..144

insiders?

Secondly,“what is illegal insider trading?”

Based on the definition

provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),

insiders “are chairmen,

directors, officers, etc., and principal shareholders with 10 percent or more oftheir own
..147

firm's common stock.

Insiders are also thought to have access to privileged
148

information of the companies they work for.
A major presumption about corporate insiders, especially those who constitute the
management of a company, is that they possess highly privileged and important
information concerning a firm’s potential for success in the future, which is not
149

accessible to other users of financial statements such as investors and shareholders.
Thus, it is not hard to see why corporate executives would use this information to their
150

own advantage by engaging in trading activities,

However, insiders may have other

reasons for buying or selling the shares of their firm.

The important point to note is

that not all insider trading is done because people have access to privileged
information.*''^ Therefore, not all cases of insider trading are considered to be illegitimate
153

or wrong.
Based on past research, the following reasons have been given as to why insider
trading is practiced;
●

To diversify portfolios and to adjust for liquidity.’^"* Corporate
management usually exercise stock options or use a plan to purchase
155

Stock.

Later, they may sell the stock they purchased in order to
156

diversify their portfolios or to raise money for financial reasons.
157

This accounts for more sales than purchases of stock by insiders.
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●

To increase corporate control.

By buying the shares or stock of a

company,the corporate executives of that company can increase their
proportion of total stockholders' equity and thereby have more voting
159

power in the company.
●

For sentimental reasons.'^® For example,two insiders in Titan
Corporation sold all the firm’s shares that they owned soon after they
161

left the company.
●

Asa result of insider trading that is based on privileged information.'^^ This case of
.163

insider trading can be divided into two smaller categories:

First, insiders may

purchase the firm's stock because they genuinely believe the stock is a good
investment. Second, insiders may trade prior to announcements that will generate
abnormal returns for themselves.”'^
165

The first three reasons outlined above, present no cause for concern over ethics,
and even the fourth reason provides a good illustration that “only insider trading with
prior knowledge of forthcoming announcements is obviously motivated by insiders'
»I66

desire for exclusively personal gain.

Since most people do not see the reasons that

compel corporate executives to practice insider trading, their response to the “average
»I67

level of insider trading

may be based on the presumption that insider trading occurs

because corporate executives misuse privileged information.'^*However, this should not
lead the public to conclude that all cases of insider trading are unethical and should be
169

prohibited by the law.

The reason behind this argument is that “the manager's

ownership of a firm's stock may motivate him to improve firm performance and therefore
increase firm value. Furthermore, the manager should have the same rights as other
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shareholders to trade his slock, as long as such trades are not motivated by private
-170

information.

I'or these reasons, the SEC only prohibits the use of“non-public.
172

material information”'^' in insider trading.
Several companies have engaged in this form of insider trading and of notable
mention is the ImClone scandal. In 2002, ImClone, a drug-making company,developed a
new drug for cancer called Erbitux.'^^ While it was waiting for FDA approval,the
company hyped its product and even “Bristol-Myers Squibb paid about two billion
dollars for a stake in Erbitux.”'^"* These ‘unsubstantiated claims’'’^ were not deemed to
be illegal because the law did not allow the FDA to contact the SEC about them, and
176

therefore, prevent ImClone from increasing the value of its stock through these claims.
However, the FDA announced that it was not going to review ImClone’s new
drug, but before the news came out officially, ImClone’s CEO,Samuel Waksal and his
family and friends, sold their shares.

This was obviously a case of insider trading and

Waksal admitted this. However, one of Waksal’s friends, Martha Stewart, who also sold
4,000 shares of ImClone at the same time as Waksal, denied any involvement in insider
trading.

Also charged with insider trading is President George W.Bush, “who sold
179

212,140 shares of Harken stock on June 22,1990, when he was a company director.’
Apparently, he had not received a letter, dated June 15,1990, from Harken’s outside
lawyer, warning the directors not to sell any ofthe company’s stock in the event that they
should receive any bad news concerning the company.'*® Unfortunately, that letter
aiTived one day after George Bush had been cleared of all the charges made against him
181

by the SEC.
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ii. Insider loans:
Another malpractice involves overcompensating company officials through the
182

use of insider loans, which do not have to be reported or disclosed to the shareholders
(a practice now prohibited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).’*^ Insider loans are quite
common in banks located in small towns because “the local business people are often the
best candidates to serve on the board.

184

Unfortunately, they are also problematic
185

because they are usually “based on less stringent credit standards than loans to others.
Two examples of insider loans involve Tyco International Limited., and Adelphia
Corporation. The Tyco scandal of2002 involved the company’s CEO,Dennis
Kozlowski. and the CFO, Mark Swatz, who were both accused of stealing $600 million
from the company.

186

The case was filed in September 2002 charging the CEO and the
«187

It was alleged

CFO with ^^grand larceny, conspiracy and falsifying business records,

188

In

that they stole $1 TOmillion from the company and spent it on a wasteful lifestyle.
addition, they earned $430million dollars by fraudulently selling Tyco shares by

withholding information from shareholders and thereby artificially keeping up the stock
189

prices.

As part of his extravagant lifestyle, Kozlowski bought a $6,000 shower curtain
190

and threw a $2 million dollar, 40^'Lbirthday party for his wife, Karen in Sardinia,

He

paid for the party with the corporate funds, which was illegal.’^* He also evaded more
192

than $1 million in sales taxes for the State of New York for art paintings.
As another example offraud via insider loans, Adelphia Corp’s Rigas family
193

(John, Tim and Michael),

along with Michael Mulchahey,'^"* were accused of looting

$263 million from the company, which became bankrupt after this scandal was
revealed.195 All four were accused ofconspiring to lie to investors, to hide more than $2

25

billion in debt, and to divert more than $100 million in corporate funds to personal
use.

1%

According to the Wall Street Journal,‘Ihe Adelphia trial, in many ways, may

best epitomize the era of corporate corruption, because it represents a full range of
alleged abuses — from lying to investors about the number ofcable subscribers to the
197

Rigas family's hidden use of Adelphia's credit to buy stock in the company.

John

Rigas faced charges of using the company’s funds for personal uses ranging from
employing a S40,000-a-year masseuse and buying seventeen cars, to spending $25
million to secure timber rights.'^^ Michael Mulchahey was accused of approving the
illegal transactions and making illegitimate adjustments to financial information, all of
199

which were characterized as ‘fraudulent manipulations.’

Even with the accusations
200

brought forth against them, Mr. Mulchahey insisted that they did not steal the money.
201

In his own opinion, they were loans,
202

data and lying to investors,

Timothy Rigas was accused of inflating financial

In other words, he misrepresented the information reflected

in the financial statements to make the company’s financial position look more
prosperous than it really was.
International Cases of Accounting Fraud
On the international level, there has also been a number offinancial accounting
scandals which are quite similar to the types of accounting fraud perpetrated in
America.^^^ Of notable mention is the Ahold financial scandal. Royal Ahold, a Dutch204:
IS the

based International company,

world’s third-biggest food retailer, after Wal-Mart

and Carrefour”^^^ and before it was accused offraud, Europeans believed that corporate
206

fraud was an American thing that could not happen in Europe.

On the 24*'' of February

2003, Ahold discovered that it had overstated its profits over the preceding two years by
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more than $500 million (euro463 million)"^^ and subsequently “announced the
«208

resignation of its chief executive and finance director,

On the same day, its market
209

value fell to euro3.3 billion from more than euro30 billion in 2001, a decline of63%.
Other scandals in Europe such as the Comroad and EM.TV scandal in Germany,
and the Lemout & Hauspie scandal in Belgium^ pale in comparison to the Ahold
scandal because these companies were very small and much younger than Ahold which
was 115 years old at the time of the scandal and had estimated sales ofeuro77 billion in
2002 before the scandal"*' Behind Ahold’s growth and fraudulent behavior was its CEO,
Cees van der Hoeven, who “won a fomiidable reputation from turning a dull company
into a growth machine.” but who also became addicted to this reputation.^*^ Since 1993,
he had acquired about fifty firms for euro19 billion in total and he also “notched up 23
»213

quarters of double-digit profit growth in a row.

However, when the company’s growth
214

began to slow down, it seemed that he could not own up to Ahold’s true state.
„215«

Subsequently, like many American companies during “the bubble years,

Ahold

started to bend the accounting rules, claiming profits of acquired firms as "organic
growth", booking capital gains from sale-and-leaseback deals as profit, and keeping
«216

billions in debt off its balance sheet.

Even though these techniques were not illegal.
217

they should have raised suspicion in the minds ofinvestors,

Some observers were

troubled by these techniques and this was made evident by the release ofthe first of six
218

reports by the Centre for Research and Analysis in Maryland in June 2001,

detailing

»219

questionable accounting at Ahold, going back to 1999.
The $500 million overstatement of profits was mainly attributable to Ahold s US
Foodservice Unit “which supplies food to schools, hospitals and restaurants-although
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„220

there are also issues over its Disco subsidiary in Argentina and several other units,

As

a result, some obser\ ers have argued that Ahold’s scandal is actually more of an
American accounting failure than a European problem.^^' The problem with such a claim
is that it “absolves Ahold's bosses of responsibility for their acquisitions and ignores the
,,222

persistent, firm-wide tendency to test the limits of acceptable accounting.
The deeper issue, in Ahold’s case, pertains to accounting methods dealing with
rebates.““^ Like many companies that buy in bulk, it gets discounts from suppliers if it can
224

meet targeted sales,

In such cases, the discreet practice is to wait until the targeted sales
225

are met before accounting for rebates,

Ahold, like many other failing firms,jumped the

gun by recording the payments before it had actually earned them.^^^ It is also believed
that Ahold may even have “booked entire rebates as profit in the first year of multi-year
„227

agreements—or simply made them up.

Many people expect the Ahold scandal to shock

Europe into “accounting and corporate-governance reform,just as the Enron scandal did
.,228

America.

Another accounting scandal on the international level involved Parmalat Dairies
Company,an Italian company that manufactures dairy products.^^^ The Parmalat scandal
involved the deception of investors, regulators, auditors, bankers and other people who
managed the company,for more than 30 years.^^® This deception was the handiwork of
231

the executives of the company,including its founder, Calisto Tanzi

and it was “simple

and amateurish in nature”^^^ compared to Enron’s elaborate fiasco with special purpose
entities and partnerships.^^^ The supposed fraud was used to serve a simple purpose with
two objectives:(1)“To hide losses, particularly those ofParmalat units in Latin America,
by inflating the company's purported assets at far-flung subsidiaries-personnel
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syslemalically created assets and records to accompany them, which were
-234

nonexistent.

,^235

(2)"To funnel money to Tanzi family businesses.

In 1998. assisted by Grant Thornton’s Italian business, Parmalat formed Bonlat
236

Financing Corporation in the Cayman Islands, one ofthe foremost tax havens.

Grant

Thornton then became the auditor for Bonlat and Parmalat’s other subsidiaries even
though Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu had replaced Grant Thornton as Parmalat’s main
auditor in 1999.“*^^ According to Italian law,companies needed to change auditors after
«239

238

nine years.

but "breaking out pieces ofthe audit to subcontractors was legal.

In 1999, Parmalat began to move false transactions and credits from its Dutch
240

companies(those that were based in Antilles) to Bonlat.

Parmalat executives made up

fictitious documents “after correctly surmising that Grant Thornton would not send third,,241

party confirmation letters to verify them in connection with the audits,

It was alleged

that the auditors sent the verification request through the internal mail system of
242

Parmalat.*"

For a simple, clear-cut business, Parmalat had a complex financial structure,
engaged in off-balance sheet financing and used special purpose vehicles that lacked
transparency for the sole purpose of making its position in general very
243

incomprehensible.

244

Its financial structure began to fall apart in December 2003,

when Parmalat was unable to redeem a maturing 150 million bond. Shortly thereafter,
Bank of America informed Parmalat that an account purportedly held by Bonlat
„245

containing about $5 billion in cash and securities did not exist.
246

revelation, Parmalat fell apart,

Subsequent to this

More than $12 billion was missing from the

company's accounts” which accounted for about 0.8 percent of Italy’s Gross Domestic
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Product (ODP).'**^ Therefore, based on analysis from tlie standpoint of relative GDP,the
248

Enron scandal is minor and insignificant compared to Parmalat’s case.
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Ill: Examining Accounting Fraud from the Standpoint
of Business Ethics

Business Ethics
v249

Since fraud involves “deception made for personal gain,

it is only logical that

a discussion of fraud also include a discussion ofethics, specifically business ethics.
,,250

which “examines ethical rules and principles within a commercial context,

The

proliferation of cases of fraudulent financial reporting, constituting unethical practices
251

over the past decade.

raises the question ofthe relevance and effect of business ethics

on the corporate world. Is business ethics a factor in deterring fraud or has accounting
fraud advanced so far that business ethics no longer plays a role in checking it? Is the
alleged decline in business ethics over the past years responsible for the increase in
252

accounting fraud and other scandals?
Relationship Between Business Ethics and Accounting Fraud
Many studies indicate that the type oftraining offered to those in business schools
253

is partly responsible for the unethical behavior that those people exhibit over time.
However, other studies also show that by the time people go to college, they have already
inculcated the basic ethical beliefs system and any attempt to provide fresh ethical
254

training at that point, is doomed to fail,

These studies illustrate the views held by two

groups of people (business school educators and business leaders) on the issue of
255

business ethics

Generally,“business educators seem to attach major importance to the
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"bureaucratic" ways of dealing with ethical issues whereas business executives tend to
,,256

prefer the least possible outside intervention in their dealing with ethical questions.
I he view of the business leaders is particularly relevant to this discussion because
of the nature of accounting fraud in the corporate world. Studies show that in most cases
of fraudulent financial reporting, the corporate executives are responsible for committing
the fraud, not necessarily the employees.^^^ Even though an employee might detect fraud,
many employees would not have witnessed the fraud being committed or they may not
even know about it."‘^^ However, according to the findings ofthe research project ofthe
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations ofthe Treadway Commission, the CEO,CFO
and controller were the top three officers named in most ofthe fraud cases. Lower level
personnel were named in much fewer cases(but this could be because SEC enforcement
actions may be aimed at exposing fraud committed by top executives more often than for
lower level personnel). In some cases, outsiders such as customers and external auditors
259

were named as being involved in the fraud.
According to David Wolfe and Dana Hermanson in their article titled “The Fraud
Diamond: Considering the Four Elements of Fraud,” one ofthe necessary traits of a
fraudster is the ability to tell lies “effectively and consistently”^^^ Telling lies is clearly
unethical, but in the same article, the authors explain that a fraudster will also rationalize
«26l

that the “fraudulent behavior is worth the risks.

This shows that while a fraudster

might have a personal code of ethics, in rationalizing the fraudulent act he is committing,
he puts his ethical beliefs aside and inadvertently, he puts business ethics aside as well.
This is summed up in the popular saying that “an executive who cheats in golf will cheat
in business.,,262
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act “puts corporate executives at risk for the unethical
„263

behavior of their employees - unless they can show they provided ethics training,

As

a result, there is now a new approach to ethics that is becoming quite common in the
corporate world of America. This approach stems from the assumption that ethics, in
general, can be taught as a way of minimizing the instances of unethical behavior by
264

corporate executives.

However, this assumption does not take into consideration two significant
characteristics of business ethics, according to Noah Pickus, associate director ofthe
265

Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University.

The first aspect is that the most

troubling cases of ethical misconduct in the corporate world did not arise because the
266

individuals involved did not have adequate knowledge ofthe rules,

Instead, those
267

cases arose from deliberate and premeditated attempts to bypass the rules in question.
The second aspect of business ethics is that corporations usually “enforce,for
„268

good or ill, their own ethical standards.

Pickus suggests that if companies really

enforce ethical standards, it will be evident in every aspect oftheir corporate culture, not
269

only in the rules and regulations,

So,if this is the case, does it mean that companies

wasted “the money they [spent] on ethics training - an estimated $6.1 billion [in 2005]
»270

just to meet the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley?

Pickus’ answer to that question is

that “it is fair to say that scaring people into improving their behavior may be one
effective tool, but clearly for the long run, it has nothing to do with the way your
company operates. Indeed, it suggests that the whole problem is about bad people rather
,»271

than about poorly designed structures.

Essentially, he suggests that accounting fraud
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occurs as a result of unethical people, or people who make unethical choices, as opposed
to a company having a weak ethical framework or a poor system of business ethics.
An aspect of the relationship between business ethics and accounting fraud, which
is probably the most obvious, is that committing fraud is a direct violation of the rules of
business ethical conduct.“^" Milton Friedman, a contemporary of Adam Smith, spelled
273

this out in his article about the profit-making function of business.

In this article,

Friedman highlights several factors that impose limitations on a business that
concentrates on making profits:^^*^
●

The company must obey the rules set by society (i.e., government).

●

It must engage in open and fair competition.

●

It must not practice deception or fraud.

275

Clearly, corporations that were involved in accounting scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom broke these basic rules that Friedman had set forth in relation to business
ethics.^^^’
The relationship between business ethics and fraud was also emphasized in a
survey conducted by Vicky B Heiman-Hoffman, Kimberly P Morgan, and James M
Patton.277 In their study, they asked 130 practicing auditors to “rank 30 commonly cited
potential warning signs as to their relative importance in spotting fraudulent financial
„278

reporting.

The results of this survey showed that “auditors generally “perceived”

attitude factors to be more indicative of fraud than situational factors. In fact, the highest
»279

ranked factor was client dishonesty,

In addition, in the September/October 2003 Issue

of The Journal ofCorporate Accounting and Finance,the authors state that “there
appears to be a correlation between ethics and fraud. For example, certain ethics-related
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alliludcs. such as dishonesty and overaggressive behavior, seem to be antecedents to
fraud, fhcrefore. effective [business] ethics are the antithesis ofconditions favorable to
.0X0

fraud.

Finally, in another survey conducted by Tommie Singleton, Brett King, Frank M.
Messina, and Richard A. Turpen, the researchers took a survey of real cases offraud to
pinpoint the various ethics activities that could serve as efficient ways of preventing and
281

detecting fraud.”

The respondents pinpointed several reasons which helped to explain
282

why fraud occurs.”
controls.

.283

The most highly ranked reason for fraud was “insufficient internal
«284

Next on the list was “Other

and “the third item was weak ethics policy or

code of conduct. Apparently, a weak ethical environment has the potential to weaken
«285

internal control systems and lead to fraud.
Business Ethics and Factors Contributing to Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Before discussing the effect of business ethics on fraudulent financial reporting, it
is necessary to identify the factors that contribute to accounting fraud. According to Roy
T Van Brunt, formerly an assistant chief accountant with the Office of the Chief
286

Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
●

these factors include:

Management that has poor tone at the top, does not emphasize
controls, chooses not to punish identified embezzlers, and does not
communicate to employees its values or a clear position regarding
conflicts of interest;

●

Senior executives that are not restrained on expenditures or gifts and
whose salaries do notjustify their lifestyles;
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●

A weak internal control environment where internal auditors do not
have investigative authority; and

●

Accounting policies and procedures that are "lax, liberal, and not
1.287

[properly] enforced.
Based on the history of government’s attempt to regulate the accounting
profession through legislation. Howard Rockness and Joanne Rockness assert that
'"attempting to impose transparency, integrity, and honesty as underlying values in
corporate management and financial reporting has failed to prevent periodic systemic
ethical failure. .288 In other words, they suggest that using regulation and legislation to
impose ethical conduct on the management of corporations does not prevent fraudulent
financial reporting in the long run. Instead, management of corporations and the auditors
who audit their financial statements have reacted to increasing regulation, by discovenng
innovative ways to hide relevant financial information from the people who need this
289

relevant information, by making the statements difficult to understand.
It is important to note that “business ethics is not a set ofimpositions and
constraints but rather is the motivating force behind business behaviors and that virtues
„290

are social traits even though they are reflected in individual actions,

Having said this.

three corporate trends resulting from ethical behavior of management executives and the
external auditors that work for them should be discussed. These corporate trends allow
us to see how instances of unethical conduct have increased in spite ofthe code of ethics
that is established in corporations, as well as the threat ofsuffering serious repercussions
291

for such fraudulent acts.
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I he lirsl trend relates to how people view ethics.

Increasingly, it is becoming
,,293

customar\ to see ethics as “just a matter of having rules and playing by the rules,

In

lact. there was a competition to see who could “most creatively stay within the letter of
„294

the law while bending the rules for personal gain,

It became acceptable to focus on

doing what was correct in principle, without considering whether or not the action was
295

morally right.^

The second trend was that internal issues were more important to people

than were external issues.”^^ In an effort to achieve personal satisfaction, people began to
297

locus more on becoming rich and being successful instead of personal fulfillment,

The

third trend was that as people became more obsessed with getting quick results, they
298

became more impatient and were less modest in their expectations.
Dobson, in his article titled “The Role of Ethics in Global Corporate Culture,
asserts that a weak belief system and a culture that lacks a basic ethical foundation and
framework are the inevitable end-products when the management and employees of
299

corporations lack proper ethical mind-sets,

The changes that result from this situation
300

will occur as a result of needs that are economically-based instead of ethical needs.
Therefore, if corporations do not build a strong culture, or ifthey build a culture that does
not challenge unethical behaviors, then these behaviors will spread within the corporation
301

in such a way that major fraud is very likely to occur.
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IV: Effects of Accounting Fraud
Overview
I he various accounting scandals and malpractices mentioned in the previous
section above have had different effects on the involved companies, industries and even
on the economy. The Enron and WorldCom scandals led to the legislation of the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which has “increased the penalties for fraudulent and misleading
conduct.

In reference to the malpractice of overcompensating officials using insider

loans,“according to the Corporate Library, 1,133 of the top 1,500 companies(roughly 75
,,303

percent) have now disclosed insider loans.

A survey conducted at three large public universities in the Southeast in 2002
revealed that contrary to media speculation, the collapse ofEnron as a result ofthe
aforementioned scandal, will not deter students from majoring in accounting(65%).

In

light of the various accounting scandals already mentioned, a survey conducted by one of
the big four accounting firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers, revealed the “expectations by 3
out of4 senior executives at major companies that boards of directors will play a more
active role in corporate oversight. In addition, over halfofthe respondents reported that
the audit committee of their board already has, or will, make changes in its makeup or
„305

procedures.

Changes in Financial Reporting As a Result of Recent Scandals
The corporate world has been affected by many ofthe recent accounting scandals
and as a result, companies have had to implement changes in the way they report
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financial inlbimalion. Perhaps one of the most important changes in financial reporting
in the corporate world as a result of the recent accounting scandals relates to the
306

Sarbanes-Oxlev Act of 2002.

This is because the act was passed in order to help
,^07

^‘restore public confidence in the financial reporting process,

Based on this objective,

one of the requirements of SOX is that the Chief Executive Officers(CEOs)and Chief
Financial Officers(CFOs)of companies must certify financial statements, in order to
emphasize the accountability of management and top executives, with regards to how
308

financial and accounting information is reported and recorded.
In addition, one of the proposed areas where changes are necessary is in the area
of revenue recognition, according to the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB).^^‘^ This is because revenue is the “largest entry”^'^on the financial statements of
most companies and in most cases involving fraudulent financial reporting, it is usually
311

the item that is most affected or tampered with.
More importantly though,the rise in the number of accounting scandals has had
two different but rational effects on the corporate world.^*^ First, forensic accounting
skills now play a critical role in unraveling the complex accounting methods that have
made financial statements very complicated and difficult to understand^ Second,the
public’s demand for accountability and change,followed by the government’s subsequent
314

legislative involvement, has changed the face ofcorporate governance.
Existing Problems With the Corporate System
Before continuing a discussion on the changes in financial reporting in the
corporate world, it is necessary to discuss the existing problems within the corporate
315

reporting system.

First of all, there is an inadequacy of a well-developed and corporate
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316

governance policy that can be put into practice,

The main purpose ofcorporate

governance is to “enhance the value of a company through ethical behavior, espousing a
policy of openness and fairness and ensuring informed decision making throughout the
-317

company.

Regrettably, the board of directors who were expected to be ethical became
318

involved in unethical practices.

Due to pressure from stockholders to ensure that the

returns on their investment continued to increase, certain boards of directors and audit
committees have resorted to disreputable ways in order to ensure that their earnings
319

figures stay high,

In addition, pressure from executives to “maximize bonuses based
v320

on stock performance,

as well as the attractiveness ofthe stock market which was

growing at a very fast rate, are two factors that have also encouraged management of
321

companies to maintain high earnings figures at any cost.
Second, many corporations are not transparent and honest in reporting financial
322

information to users.

Even though the United States has the most rigorous financial

reporting standards in the world, several factors such as the abuse of corporate power by
top executives, and fraudulent accounting practices show that the present financial system
323

is under significant pressure.

By relying on overstated stock prices to pay for

acquisitions and by depending on the potential of a brilliant future, several companies
324

have experienced tremendous growth and development,

However, in some other

companies, it appears as if the measures that are instituted to protect the interests of
shareholders have been relegated to the back because ofthese companies’ focus on the
bottom line.^^^
The traditional role of auditors in financial reporting is to express an opinion on
326

whether or not financial statements are presented in accordance with GAAP.
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In direct

conlrasl lo ihe expcclalions of the public regarding the role of auditors, the auditor has no
absolute duty to expose fraud even though SAS 99 makes suggestions as to the steps
auditors should take to make sure that the planning and execution oftheir audits takes
327

care of issues relating to fraud.
I he third area of weakness^”* or problem area witliin the corporate reporting
330

system is the lack of an effective and efficient internal control system.

Ifan internal

control system is effective and efficient, it will usually aid a company in attaining its
331

profitability goals and reduce the loss of capital and assets,

Nevertheless, internal

control cannot improve a management system that is innately weak or completely
332

guarantee that financial reporting is reliable.
As a result of SOX, many companies are now forced to deal with a rising number
of conditions ranging from legal and regulatory conditions to economic reporting
333

conditions.

They are now spending large sums of money scrutinizing their existing

systems, and "‘adopting or improving their governance and internal controls to meet the
standards set by [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] sections 403 and 404.”^^"^ As the current face of
business changes, accountants and corporations must put less emphasis on the traditional
approach that focused on complying with GAAP,and instead, they should put more
emphasis on studying and exploring the core traits that form the backbone ofcorporate
335

behavior and management.

This might help prevent future meltdowns and provide

assurance as to the maintenance ofthe two main qualities of corporate reporting 336

transparency and honesty.
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●ssues Related to Government Legislation
active
^Pari from passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the government has played an
role in ;
" Tiplcnienting new legislation and amending existing legislation m order to limit
the
'’PP^nunitics that companies may have to fraudulently report financial statements,

The Sarb

^nes-Oxley Act itself amends Chapter 73 of Title 18 of the U.S Code “dealing
„337

The

"'Hi obstruction of justice within the context of crimes and criminal procedure,
amendin

^nis affect any one who defies the sections that have just been added, and they

include:
.

A fine and/or imprisonment of not more than 20 years for “whoever
knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covets up, falsifies, or
makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with
the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” an investigation or
proceeding by a federal department or agency or any case filed in
bankruptcy court.

.

A fine and/or imprisonment of not more than 10 years for the failure of
any accountant who conducts an audit of a publicly traded company to
“maintain all audit and review work papers for a period of five years
from the end of the fiscal period in which the audit or review

was

concluded.”
●

“Whistleblower” protections for employees who, among other things,
lawfully “provide information, cause information to be provided, or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
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employee reasonably believes” violates specific sections ofthe U.S.
Code or any rules or regulations ofthe SEC.
●

A fine and/or imprisonment for not more than 20 years for anyone who
corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document.
or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the
object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding” or
“otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding,
»,338

or attempts to do so.

At this point, it is important to note that there are certain people who believe that
increased government regulation of the accounting profession will only have harmful
effects.334 According to James Sheehan,the author of Global Greens, in his article titled
‘‘Real Accounting Fraud,” he asserts that the legislators who are making new rules
«340

regarding financial reporting, do not have “even a basic understanding of business,

In

his opinion, “all members of Congress are direct participants in the biggest accounting
fraud going - the federal government- and have never lifted a finger to bring it under
control.,,341 In other words, he asserts that the legislators should not be the ones making
rules to correct or minimize accounting fraud because they are involved in other forms of
accounting fraud themselves. Some ofthese lawmakers are quite ignorant about the
underlying issues behind even the most publicized accounting scandals such as the Enron
342

and WorldCom scandals.

This was made evident when one ofthe legislators could not name any other
high profile bankruptcy besides Enron(he said the word “and” about 10 times before
„343

giving up).

Another legislator thought that WorldCom had lost $3.8 billion when in
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actual fact, it had capitalized $3.8 billion of operating expenses.

He displayed his

flagrant ignorance by asking over and over again,‘‘Do you know where that money
-345

went?
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to the utter disbelief of those who witnessed him make this statement.

These

instances where politicians have displayed their ignorance about business led Sheehan to
conclude that “their biggest illusion is that tliey have the power to force companies to be
truthful.-347
In Sheehan's opinion, the problems that we are presently dealing with in the
accounting profession, stem from following accounting standards that are too strict
348

because they are products of the past efforts ofthe government to reform the standards.
Accounting that is based on principles works well, but the combination oflawsuits and
the SEC’s sweeping efforts to regulate the accounting profession, have forced auditors to
shift their focus to other approaches.^"*^ Presently, the SEC attempts to handle almost
every situation that falls in a gray area, by imposing rules and regulations.^^® Ultimately,
it hopes that this will help prevent any kind offraud, but the problem with this approach
is that when accounting rules are too rigid, people usually find easy ways to evade
them.351 Companies evade accounting rules for different reasons - some companies do it
to improve accuracy and other companies do it to increase their earnings by falsifying the
numbers.352 Changing the nature of a transaction, however slightly, can create new
issues that cannot be resolved by applying accounting standards that are too rigid.
is the reason why fraudulently misstated financial statements can meet all the
354

requirements of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Because some aspects of accounting are dependent on the judgment of
355

management, we can expect that accounting will always be inaccurate.
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However,

This

limiting managerial discretion more than likely will not cause accounting to be more
356

informati\ e than it presently is.

While some companies “develop a reputation for
«357

forecasting ability, others develop a reputation for missing their numbers,

In some

cases. foreeasting accuracy will go unnoticed for many years or fiscal periods and for
legislators to act as if this is not going on shows that they are merely deceiving
themselves.'35S
Because the government is focusing more attention on regulating accounting
standards, there will be a serious decline in the quality of eamings.^^^ In addition,
virtually no company will have the ability to make forecasts that are uncertain or even
360

assert any notions in its financial reports,

Therefore, the company will completely

leave out of the management’s discussion and analysis(MD & A)ofits own record
keeping,“internal forecasts and assumptions the company [which] actually uses in its
,061

internal planning.

Consequently, information that investors might find useful and

important, more than likely, will not be disclosed in case the forecasts eventually end up
362

being a little inconsistent or ill-timed.

Thus, as legislators are poised to accumulate and exert great new powers over the
accounting profession, in the form of regulations, they need to understand that these rules
and regulations may only worsen the current state of affairs.^^^ This is because these
legislators have no real understanding of accounting and they do not even appropriate any
of the accounting standards to themselves via the govemment.^^ Sheehan concludes that
we should therefore, expect these legislators and government officials to “demagogue
the issue and propose even more stringent regulatory controls, when the unintended
«365

consequences come to pass.
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Conclusion of Thesis:
After conducting research, there is a need to re-evaluate whether or not I have
answered the research questions I listed at the beginning ofthis thesis and also whether or
not the purpose of this thesis has been fulfilled. I will therefore conclude this thesis paper
by answering those questions explicitly:
1. if fraud is a negative thing, can it have ANY positive effects? If so, what are its
positive effects and how have they changed the face of accounting in the corporate
world? From the very introduction, I have made it clear that fraud is definitely a negative
thing because it destroys public confidence in the accounting profession, destroys
companies in the long run and causes major losses to shareholders and investors. It is
very ironic that even though fraud is perpetrated, in many cases, to make a company’s
financial position look better than it really is, when it is finally exposed,the price that the
individuals involved in the fraud pay, in terms of serving prison sentences, losing jobs,
tarnishing formidable reputations and facing the full wrath ofthe law in other ways, is
much greater than the ‘good’ that was intended by committing the fraudulent acts. In
other words, the costs offraud far exceed its benefits.
However,fraud can have many positive effects in spite ofthe negativity that
surrounds it and those positive effects include:

□

Increased regulation of accounting in the corporate world. The passing and
subsequent implementation ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 provides a good
illustration. It has helped to make management ofcompanies more accountable to
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investors and creditors and it has also helped to increase the effectiveness ofthe audit
committee in corporate governance, among other things.
□

Increased go\ ernment intervention and participation in corporate governance by
establishing committees and other structures designed solely to focus on preventing
and detecting fraud. The Corporate Fraud Task Force provides a good example of
this.

□

Reduced opportunities in which fraudulent financial reporting can be committed and
increased ways in which it can be prevented and detected. The increased emphasis on
internal controls serves as an illustration of this point.

□

Development of specialized skills leading to the establishment of professional bodies
specifically aimed at preventing fraud such as the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners. In addition, forensic accounting is a developing area of accounting that
will be more relevant as a result of fraud in the corporate world.

These positives have changed the face of accounting in the corporate world by
challenging established rules such as GAAP to the point that such rules are either
improved or completely discarded in favor of rules which encourage more pragmatic
solutions to existing problems.
2. What does the current trend in accounting fraud say about the role of business
ethics in the corporate world? Is there a correlation or relationship between
business ethics and fraud or is fraud influenced primarily by other factors? Will a
greater regard for business ethics result in a decline in cases of fraudulent financial
reporting? From the various research studies detailed above, it is obvious that the current
trend in accounting fraud points to a need for business ethics in the corporate world. The
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concepts ol'fraud and business ethics are related in that applying business ethics in less
cases or matters of decision in the corporate world will more than likely result in one
form of fraud or the other. Research also suggests that if companies actually enforce
ethical standards, the results will be evident in every aspect of their corporate culture
including the rules and regulations. Thus, it can be concluded that when people are
ethical and choose to make ethical decisions, accounting fraud is less likely to occur.
Finally, in conclusion, based on the foregoing research, I believe that I have
provided convincing evidence that in spite ofthe negative aspects offraud, it can
ultimately have some positive aspects, which can set the wheels ofchange in motion in
the American corporate world.
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APPENDIX
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Accounting Fraud in the 1980s and 1990s
I. COSO Research
Overview
When cases involving fraudulent financial reporting draw public attention,
concerns over the credibility of the U.S financial reporting process are raised, and the
roles of professionals in financial reporting, including auditors, are also called into
question. In light of the proliferation ofsuch cases, the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission(COSO)decided to conduct a research
project to provide much needed broad and up-to-date information on how to deal with
fraudulent financial reporting and related cases involving fraud. The focus ofthis
research was on Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases(AAERs)involving a
suspected violation of Rule 10(b)-5 ofthe 1934 Securities Exchange Actor Section 17
(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, since they are the main antifraud provisions having to do
with the reporting of financial statements.
The findings from the detailed analysis ofthese cases were grouped into five
categories:
1. Nature of the companies involved: In comparison to public registrants(which

are

very large companies), most ofthe companies who committed financial statement
fraud were relatively small. In addition, some ofthese companies had net losses or
were close to their break-even points in the pre-fraud periods. Thus,the fraudulent
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2. acts were probably intended to prevent the companies from reporting more net losses
or to preserv e and improve the current corporate successes ofthe companies.
3. Nature of the Control Environment(Top Management and the Board): In many of
these cases, top senior executives ofthe company such as the CEO and the CFO,
were involved in the fraud and there was either no audit committee, or else the audit
committee rarely met (i.e.. they typically only met once a year). The members ofthe
Boards of Directors were mostly insiders or “grey” officers with significant interest in
the companies and little or no relevant experience. It was also quite common for the
directors and other powerful officers to have family relationships with one another.
4. Nature of the Frauds: The combined total of the fraud amounts were quite large in
comparison to the sizes of these companies. These frauds took place over two or more
fiscal periods and in most cases, the fraud was perpetrated by overstating revenues
and assets.
5. Issues related to the External Auditor: Both large and small audit firms were
associated with these companies and they issued all types of audit reports. In some
cases, the external auditors were named for direct or indirect involvement in the fraud
and some companies switched auditors during the period the fraud was perpetrated.
6. Consequences for the Company and Individuals Involved: The consequences of
committing fraud to the company ranged from bankruptcy to imposed financial
penalties. For individuals involved, the consequences included forceful resignation
and class action legal suits.
In addition, the research team analyzed the findings to come up with relevant
implications for specific individuals such as internal and external auditors. These
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implications, whicli were related to the categories ofthe findings, were inherently
suggestions of \\ a\ s that the standard and quality of financial reporting could be raised
and enhanced. Interestingly, many of these suggestions were obviously not adequately
addressed by Corporate America because they were precisely the same problem areas that
led to the enormous scandals of the early 2000s. Some ofthese suggestions were:
●

The directors and top key officers in small companies need to be more
independent and the audit committee practices need to be more rigorous.

●

Interim reviews of financial statements and the related controls are very
important and as a result, should be taken more seriously.

●

Auditors need to approach the audit by acquiring information from different
sources, as this will help them establish the proper professional skepticism
towards each engagement.

●

The fact that the companies involved in the acts offraud were relatively small
(relative to other public companies)suggests that by not implementing costeffective internal controls, the companies were more likely to commit fraud.

Description of Research Approach
The first step undertaken by the researchers was to identify all alleged instances
of fraudulent financial reporting documented by the SEC via an AAER issued between
1987 and 1997. The research focused on fraud cases involving SEC registrants and which
led to the issuance of an AAER because the researchers wanted information that was
widely available about the companies involved in fraud. An inherent limitation of this
approach was the possibility that some important cases involving fraudulent financial
reporting would be omitted, but the researchers justified their use ofthis approach by
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asserting that there was no better source of widely available cases involving financial
statement fraud.
In this report, fraudulent financial reporting was examined, holding material
misstatements in perspective. Using the AAERs issued between 1987 and 1997,they
came up with a random sample of200 companies, on which they collected detailed data
including: a list of the specific misstated financial statements which they used to
determine how long the alleged fraud took place, a clue as to what motivated the
committing of the fraud and the dollar amounts ofthe fraud and the key accounts that
were involved. They also got copies of and reviewed the audited financial statements
filed in the Form 10-K with the SEC before the first known instance offraudulent
financial statements in order to identify the auditor who audited them. In addition, they
reviewed the audited financial statements in the Form 10-K filed with the SEC for the last
fiscal year the alleged fraud occurred, also known as “last fraud financial statements,” in
order to identify the auditor at that time and the kind ofaudit opinion issued during that
period. They obtained and reviewed copies of the last proxy statement issued to
shareholders during the period the fraud took place, in order to get information on certain
aspects of the directors and audit committee. They obtained information on the
consequences of the exposure ofthe fraud for the company and senior management by
searching for articles from finance-related journals, magazines and newspapers using the
Lexis/Nexis database. Some ofthe limitations they faced in obtaining these data in this
way were the incompleteness ofthe data sources as well as the quality oftheir
professional judgments.
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Detailed Analyses of Instances of Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987-1997:
As already mentioned, most of the companies in the sample were small relative to
other public companies, especially since they operated below the $100 million size range.
Some of them were undergoing financial stress in the period before the fraud occurred. In
analyzing the income statements, the researchers observed that the net income of22
companies decreased before the first year of the fraud while the net income of30
companies increased during the same period. These findings suggest that the frauds may
been intended to increase net income for those companies whose net income was
decreasing and to maintain the increase in net income for those companies whose net
income had already been on the increase. The researchers also found that most ofthe
companies included in this study were traded in Over-the-Counter Markets including the
New York and American Stock Exchanges. Most ofthe fraud companies operated in the
following industries: computer hardware and software, other manufacturing,financial
services and healthcare/health products. They also discovered that the headquarters ofthe
companies was the most common place where the frauds were committed or where
instructions to commit the fraud originated and was coordinated from.In addition,the
headquarters were located in such states as New York and California, which are
significant areas of business activity in the United States.
In examining the various company representatives and outsiders involved in
alleged instances offraud,the researchers found that even though the names ofthese
individuals were mentioned in an AAER,there was no clear evidence that these people
violated the antifraud statutes. Also,these same individuals did not own up to any guilt
at all. The CEO,CFO and controller were the top three officers named in most ofthe
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fraud cases. I.o wer le\ el personnel were named in much fewer cases, but this may be
because Sl vC enforcement actions may be aimed at exposing fraud committed by top
executives more often than for lower level personnel. In some cases, outsiders such as
customers and external auditors were named as being involved in the fraud.
In the AAhRs,some of the reasons most commonly put forward for committing
the fraud include: avoiding reporting negative financial events such as a pre-tax loss and
to boost other financial results; hiding the misappropriation of assets for personal gain;
and raising stock prices in order to increase the rewards of insider trading and to receive
more cash for the issuance of new securities. In addition, most ofthe members ofthe
audit committee were outsiders and in many cases, there were no audit committee
members who were insiders. The researchers thus concluded that the audit committees
seemed reasonably independent. They also found out, however,that the audit committees
of these companies met only once or twice a year and most oftheir members were not
accounting or finance professionals. In contrast, most ofthe members ofthe Board of
Directors were usually insiders and grey directors such as company legal counsel and
former company officers. The members of the Board of Directors and other officers
usually had a significant financial interest in the company and they met six or seven times
annually. In some cases, there was no segregation of duties for certain offices, which
should normally be segregated such as the positions ofthe CEO and CFO. While
reviewing the proxy statements, the researchers observed some miscellaneous events,
which might signify a greater likelihood offraud such as the receipt of material loans
from the company by the officers, or directors, which were not within the normal course
of business, and current legal or regulatory actions against certain officers and directors.
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I he dollar amount of the frauds ranged from $20,000(the smallest)to $910
million (the largest). However, since there is no consistency in the report ofthe dollar
amounts in the A AHRs. the researchers used information such as asset frauds expressed
as misstatements of assets, to come up with the most suitable measure ofthe fraud
amount. The financial statement frauds covered multiple fiscal periods, with the longest
fraud period lasting six years,
fhe two most common ways in which the financial statements were materially
misstated were by overstating revenues using improper methods ofrecognizing revenue,
and overstating assets by adopting inappropriate measures. Some ofthe techniques used
to misstate revenues by stating fictitious revenue include: sham sales(employees falsified
inventory records, shipping records, and invoices, in order to hide the fraud), recognizing
revenue before all the terms of the sale were completed, conditional sales, improper
cutoff of sales, improper use of the percentage of completion method, making
unauthorized shipments and recording revenues for consignment shipments. In many
cases, external auditors did not detect the fraud because the company representatives
falsified responses to confirmation requests, directly or indirectly by asking third parties
such as customers, to change the confirmation response. In addition, inventory and
accounts receivable were the two asset accounts that were usually misstated. Various
audit reports were issued during these fraud periods. In the cases where the auditor

was

named in an A AER,the auditor was said to have either violated or helped others in
violating Rule 1 Ob ofthe 1934 Securities Act or else, the auditor was alleged to have
done a poor quality audit.
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Subsequent to the fraud period, about half ofthe companies included in the
sample were either non-existent or else the form of ownership and existence that the
company operated under was significantly different from the way it had been before the
fraud occurred. Some were bankrupt and others were delisted. The total amount offines
and settlements that the sample companies paid was $348 million, and for some ofthese
companies, their top executives had to pay fines to the SEC for actions that were
personally taken against them. Other ways in which the top executives were penalized
included termination, resignation and criminal prosecution in some cases.
Implications of the Study
The integrity and reputation ofexecutives is important in light ofthe fact that they
may override internal controls and may be willing to manipulate information in
inappropriate ways that leads to material misstatements. Auditors need to effectively
screen potential risks such as the effect of management’s integrity and ethical values, in
order to obtain a better evaluation of overall audit risk. CEOs and COOs need to be
educated in standard reporting requirements and professionals with expertise in financial
reporting need to be involved in the financial reporting process as this may help to
educate those who are less knowledgeable or less qualified in such areas. In addition,
members of the Board of Directors and auditors should look out for executives who use
what they know about financial reporting to conceal fraud.
Due to the importance ofthe audit committee in performing financial oversight,
risk analysis and evaluation of management integrity functions, the audit committees of
smaller companies in particular, need to increase the number oftheir meetings in each
year and need to have more experts or professionals on board, in order to function
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effeclivcl). In perromiing its various functions, the audit committee needs to have access
to reliable data and inlbimation. which it can obtain from top management In addition,
the Boards of Directors of these companies need to be more independent and possess
more expertise in order to perform their monitoring function effectively.
Another observation of the researchers was that the frauds were often started in a
Form 10-Q with relati\ ely small amounts but usually, the amounts later increased
significantly over two or more fiscal periods if the fraud remained undetected. In light of
this, external auditors and audit committees need to examine quarterly financial
statements more closely. In addition, management and internal auditors need to review
the processes and controls surrounding the preparation ofinterim reports in order to
determine if they are adequate or if they need to be as rigorous as the processes and
controls related to the preparation of annual financial statements. When there is a focus
on the control environment, useful information may be provided with regards to the
possible improper accounting for revenue transactions. In addition, evidence that
company managers made important decisions in the process of valuation may indicate the
existence of the use of overly aggressive and inappropriate valuation techniques. Auditors
should focus on the control environment and be aware that there is a possibility that
greater audit risk exists for companies with weak audit committees and Boards of
Directors.
II. The Focus on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting issued a major
report called the “Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting”
in October 1987, as a way of bringing more focus on and dealing with concerns about
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fraudulent financial reporting. Ten years later, there were many efforts geared towards
reducing the instances of fraudulent financial reporting. The focus ofthose efforts was
mainly on the parts played by auditors, managers, members of Boards of Directors and
audit committees.
fhe importance of the auditor's role in detecting fi^ud in financial statements
cannot be undermined because the public places confidence in them to provide
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free fi’om material misstatements.
In light of this, the auditing profession has made many good faith efforts to improve the
way auditors detect financial statement fraud, and they include: the issuance ofSAS No.
53 (designed to reduce the expectation gap between the reasonable assurance that
auditors provide and the expectations that financial statement users had for detecting
fraudulent financial statement reporting); the Public Oversight Board’s 1993 Special
Report(focused on improving the way auditors detected management fraud); the AICPA
Board of Director's 1993 Report(endorsed the previous proposals to help auditors in
detecting material misstatements in fraudulent financial statements).
In addition, AICPA SEC Practice Section Initiatives gave directions about rising
and unanswered questions related to the auditing practice, which came up through
litigation analysis, peer review or internal examination. The issuance ofa new fraud
standard: SAS No. 82 clarified the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud in financial
statements, gave more guidance to auditors on how to improve their performance and
particularly identified more risk factors which were frequently known to be connected to
fraudulent financial reporting cases. The researchers believe that the Auditing Standards
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Board (ASB) will find the “Report on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 1987 1997
in reviewing SAS No. 82.
Aeeording to the 1987 report of the Treadway Commission,in order to prevent
and detect fraudulent financial reporting in advance,the company that prepares th
financial statements must initiate this process of prevention and detection. COSO s 1992
Report, which was a framework for internal control, is increasingly becoming a standard
for assessing internal controls for various entities. All in all, the board ofdirectors has
primary responsibility for ensuring that the internal control system is effective. In many
cases, the BOD delegates its oversight function to the audit committee and various
national stock exchanges have specific rules governing the composition ofthe audit
committees of the companies listed on their exchanges,
Based on the Institute of Internal Auditors’(Ill’s) study on the effectiveness of
audit committees, it was noted that the most important way that the audit committee

can

be more effective is if the members are given more background information and training.
This is because when they truly understand what they are supposed to do,then they will
carry out their responsibilities effectively. In the opinion ofthe advisory panel ofthe
Public Oversight Board (POB),the independence ofthe BODs should be increased in
order to encourage them to perform their oversight function properly. It also advised
auditors to issue objective reports within a reasonable period, which addresses the quality
and adequacy of a company’s financial reporting system. The Independence Standards
Board (ISB)and the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees were both established to help strengthen and give more
credence to the role of the audit committees and BODs.
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III.()ver\ iew of f indings From Academic Research
Research iliat had been conducted in the past on fraud risk factors was limited
because there \n as no solid conceptual model, which examined the coimection between
these factors and the likelihood that financial statements would be materially misstated
due to fraud. In light of this, Loebbecke and Willingham proposed a model, which
described the possibility of fraudulent financial reporting as a function ofthree factors,
which centered on conditions, motivation and attitudes that encouraged or allowed
management to commit fraud. The research conducted by Bell and Carcello on the
validation of fraud risk factors illustrates the difficulties that accompany the grouping of
many fraud risk factors when trying to assess the likelihood offinancial statement fraud.
The Pienus study on the effectiveness of audit tools for fraud detection discovered that
auditors who used “red flag"' checklists performed less well than those who did not use
them. Bemardi discovered that the integrity and proficiency ofthe client did not affect
the ability of the auditor to detect fraud except for managers who are highly responsive to
ethical circumstances. Bloomfield discovered that the auditor finds it hard to assess fraud
risk when faced with great legal liability for audit failure and conducts an audit for a firm
with very effective and efficient internal controls. There is convincing and reliable
evidence showing that the internal control environment ofthe firm being audited is
important when evaluating the possibility of management fraud. In general, research
findings show that boai'ds of directors ofcompanies that commit fraud are more likely to
have fewer members who are outside directors than boards ofcompanies that do not
commit fraud.
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1 he research stu(J> conducted by DeZoort and Lee revealed that financial
statement users recognize that the auditor has greater responsibility to detect financial
statement fraud under SAS No. 82 than under SAS No. 53. Loebbecke et al concluded
that the because actual material cases of fraud are rare, auditors must train themselves to
pertbrm audits in such a way that even if they do not come across a material case of
Iraud. the\ do not become so unconcerned that they do not recognize it when it actually
occurs. Based on this assertion, Deshmukh et al found that auditors must accept
inconsistent I'alse alarm rates so that the audit remains effective in spite of management
fraud. Palmrose discovered that management fraud accounted for almost fifty percent of
all lawsuits brought against auditors. Bonner et al found supporting evidence to show that
there are more lawsuits brought against auditors when fraud schemes occur often or
involve phony transactions and events. Finally, when companies first own up and
disclose fraudulent practices, their stock prices decline greatly. In addition,fewer analysts
follow the firm and fewer institutions hold its common stock subsequent to the disclosure
of such practices.
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